The Israel–Iran War, which erupted on June 13, 2025, included intense barrages of aerial and ballistic fire by both combatants for 12 consecutive days. During this period, unprecedented amounts of disinformation were disseminated, in which online psyops and influence campaigns played an active role.[1] Over the entire 12-day period, social media in Israel, Iran, and worldwide were inundated with false or manipulative information about the war, its aims, and the outcomes on the ground. Images and clips, either AI-generated or taken from other conflicts and times and decontextualized, were spread, purporting to constitute documentation of the current conflict, in order to sow fear and confusion and enhance narratives that serve the interests of a specific party. Within hours of the beginning of the war, social media featured fake images of Israeli fighter jets downed in Iran, destroyed airports and apartment buildings in Tel Aviv, enormous explosions in Teheran, and Iranian citizens protesting against their government. These images became viral on social media, and millions of individuals around the world viewed and shared them.[2] In this wave of contradictory information and public uproar, traditional media and news channels also were found to broadcast and disseminate false information, and orders issued by both governments to refrain from sharing images and information on destruction or attacks, alongside the restricted access to the internet in Iran throughout the war, made it even more difficult to verify war-related claims.
This war joins other international military conflicts in recent years — including the Russia-Ukraine War, and the war between Israel and Hamas following the October 7 attacks in 2023 — in which digital media and influence campaigns played a major role. Conflicts of this type constitute a breeding ground for the dissemination of deceptive information and false narratives, sometimes as part of mutual influence campaigns, as part of various actors’ efforts to influence local and global public opinion and affect national policies. Foreign efforts to influence public opinion and policy through online means have become an integral part of contemporary warfare, as seen by the efforts of Israel and Iran to penetrate and disrupt each other’s networks even before the armed conflict began.[3]
Furthermore, the inundation of information and the demand for live immediate updates during conflicts motivate citizens to use unmediated instant messaging platforms and view live broadcasts on them, such as news channels and live updates on Telegram, where users are exposed, at an especially high rate, to unchecked or unverified information and occasionally to fabricated and incorrect information. Moreover, the rapid technological advances in the field of AI in the past year facilitate the creation of convincing falsified visual content, which accelerates its spread and undermines professionals’ ability to check facts and verify information before it has been distributed and assimilated and public opinion has been swayed.[4] Such a dynamic and tumultuous information environment creates new, unfamiliar trends and poses enormous challenges for fact-checking organizations.
Israel is one of the world’s leaders in social media use, with high penetration rates in multiple platforms.[5] Use of Telegram has increased since October 7, and even more intensely since the outbreak of the Israel–Iran War. Users join channels that provide updates and reports that satisfy their need for immediate information, although this information is sometimes unverified and even false.[6] In addition, domestic and regional tensions in recent years have greatly increased Israeli citizens’ vulnerability to influence campaigns. However, despite this vulnerability and the extensive exposure to unverified online information, the fact-checking landscape in Israel is limited and education for media literacy is scarce: A small number of fact-checking organizations exist, their work does not the various groups that comprise Israeli society, and increasing financial and political pressure limits their activities.[7]
Recognizing the tension between dissemination of disinformation surrounding international conflicts and the growing weakness of fact-checking organizations around the world and in Israel, the current study examines the ongoing efforts of the global and local fact-checking field in the context of the Israel–Iran War, and through this examination offers a snapshot of the features of deceptive and false information that was disseminated during the war and the role that it played in it.
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References
[1] Myers, S. L., Odenheimer, N., & Solomon, E. (2025, July 15). Israel and Iran usher in new era of psychological warfare. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/15/technology/israel-iran-psychological-warfare.html
[2] Jones, G. M. (2025, June 19). How out-of-context videos mislead social media users on the Israel–Iran conflict. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/19/how-out-of-context-videos-mislead-social-media-users-on-the-israel-iran-conflict; EDMO. (2025, June 13). The first AI war: How the Iran-Israel conflict became a battlefield for generative misinformation. EDMO. https://edmo.eu/publications/the-first-ai-war-how-the-iran-israel-conflict-became-a-battlefield-for-generative-misinformation/; Murphy, M., Robinson, O., & Sardarizadeh, S. (2025, June 19). Israel–Iran conflict and AI disinformation: Dozens of AI-generated videos garner over 100 million views. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0k78715enxo
[3] Yasur, N., & Citrinowicz, D. (2024). Iranian foreign information manipulation and interference during the Swords of Iron War. INSS. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-influence/; Shah, N. (2025, July 30). What the Israel–Iran conflict revealed about wartime cyber operations. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-the-israel-iran-conflict-revealed-about-wartime-cyber-operations/
[4] Ponce de León, E., & Chenrose, A. (2025, June 24). Grok struggles with fact-checking amid Israel–Iran war. DFRLab. https://dfrlab.org/2025/06/24/grok-struggles-with-fact-checking-amid-israel-iran-war/
Wiener, A., & Stegman, O. (2024). Social media and digital platforms use in Israel (2023–2024). Israel Internet Association. https://en.isoc.org.il/data-and-statistics/social-media-and-digital-platforms-use-in-israel-2023-2024
[5] Wiener, A., & Stegman, O. (2024). Social media and digital platforms use in Israel (2023–2024). Israel Internet Association. https://en.isoc.org.il/data-and-statistics/social-media-and-digital-platforms-use-in-israel-2023-2024
[6] Ring, E. (2025, July 6). Fake news, real missiles: Israel’s Telegram crisis is a national security threat. Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2025-07-06/ty-article-opinion/.premium/fake-news-real-missiles-israels-telegram-crisis-is-a-national-security-threat/00000197-cffc-da1d-a5ff-effe6e780000
[7] Ram, Y., Wiener, A., & Ring, E. (2025, April). Disinformation resilience: Israel stakeholder analysis report. Israel Internet Association. https://www.isoc.org.il/files/docs/disinformation/Disinformation-Resilieance-Israel-Stakeholder-Analysis-Report-April2025.pdf