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ISOC-IL’s Top 10 Insights on Disinformation and Information Integrity at the IDI and EU Delegation Conference

The threats and challenges to information integrity on social media have gained increased attention and awareness in Israel since October 7 and the ongoing war in Gaza and South Lebanon. A joint symposium by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) and the European Union (EU) Delegation to Israel on December 9, 2024 brought together key leaders from civil society, media, the diplomatic corps and the private sector to exchange ideas on how to tackle the unprecedented challenges in combatting disinformation and protecting digital integrity, based on EU experience with similar threats.

The first part of the conference featured Israeli experts and representatives of civil society organizations who discussed developments from the past year, including IDI’s President, Yohanan Plesner; Head of the Democracy in the Digital Age Program, Dr. Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler; and ISOC-IL’s Vice President of Community Affairs, Edan Ring.

The speakers addressed the state of information integrity on social media platforms in Israel, outlining how Israel is currently fighting a war on several fronts on the ground, but also on an additional front, which is the information and influence war on social media.

In the second session, experts from the EU provided their perspectives on the challenges and the lessons learnt. The discussions on what Israel can learn from the EU’s experience highlighted the important role of civil society and multi-stakeholder collaborations.

Ring’s presentation of ISOC-IL’s research and activities concerning social media usage, safety trends, and the state of disinformation mitigation in Israel, is a valuable resource for the formation of concrete policy solutions for Israeli decision-makers. Below are his top ten insights on information integrity and the fight against disinformation based on ISOC-IL’s activities since October 7:

  1. Israelis Are Heavy Social Media Users
    Nearly all Israelis consume information on social media. Israelis rank among the top global consumers of social media platforms, with 98% of the general population using WhatsApp and YouTube. Not far behind is Facebook, with 87% of the population. Even conservative, generally internet-averse groups like the Haredi minority are highly engaged.
  2. Different Audiences, Different Platforms
    ISOC-IL research shows that online habits and preferences for information sources vary across different demographics. Some differences are unexpected: TikTok, for example, is generally considered a popular platform for young people in Israel but within the Arab population it’s also popular among senior citizens. These disparities influence the quality and scope of information consumed and shared, creating gaps in users’ ability to assess information reliability as well as online safety awareness.
  3. The Rise and Threat of Telegram
    The rise of Telegram in Israel is the most worrying phenomenon in the Israeli information environment in the past year. Telegram usage surged to 70% after October 7 compared to about 50% before the war began, with many users unaware of its risks. The Israeli information environment has changed dramatically since October 7, containing threats and challenges of unprecedented scope and intensity. The soaring popularity of Telegram, along with the ubiquitous reach of WhatsApp,  is a real epistemic time bomb.
  4. Pseudo-News Channels
    Telegram’s problematic nature goes beyond its lack of safety moderation—Telegram is much more than an encrypted messaging app. Hundreds of thousands of its users follow pseudo-news channels that spread unverified, unfiltered information. Many lack basic fact-checking skills, like cross-referencing sources, and the platform shows little concern or responsibility for user safety.
  5. October 7 Digital Warfare
    The October 7 massacres also marked an unprecedented digital and psychological assault on the Israeli public. The state, platforms, and public were caught off guard by an overwhelming influx of false information, conspiracy theories, and trauma-inducing content. To date, it is unclear which governing authority or state body is in charge of protecting citizens from cognitive threats like the spread of misinformation and disinformation.
  6. Civil Crisis Response
    In the hours after the outbreak of the war, citizens who were attacked online did not know how to deal with the flood of harmful content they encountered, including graphics that were particularly traumatic for children. Calls to ISOC-IL’s Internet Safety Hotline doubled and tripled as citizens struggled with distressing and contradictory content.  Civil society was the first to respond to the public’s distress and to launch tech initiatives to monitor and report harmful content. However, this had very limited success.
  7. The Road to Media Literacy
    Alongside ISOC-IL’s Safe Internet Hotline, social organizations and authorities have published guides and warnings to report offensive content. These short-term solutions help, however  Israel urgently needs to invest in media literacy and critical thinking education. The development of information literacy and in-depth critical skills for the general public from a young age, including within the formal education system, is a priority.  Initiatives like FakeOrNot.org.il, developed with the Israeli Democracy Institute and Machon Mofet, are steps in the right direction but we need more resources and investment in this direction on a national scale.
  8. Platform Responsiveness
    ISOC-IL submitted hundreds of user complaints in the first two months of the war alone. Platforms like Telegram and X were unresponsive, while others attempted to create special mechanisms to address them. Without state regulation, platforms’ actions remain voluntary, even in times of emergency. We remain dependent on the platforms’ goodwill. Thus, there is an urgent need for stricter government oversight, regulation and supervision of the platforms’ operations.
  9. Drowning in the Flood
    The need for platforms’ accountability and responsibility towards users safety is equally important. Our research about October 7 digital attacks revealed slow and inadequate platform responses to user reports, particularly regarding disinformation and incitement during the war. Reports that required human examination and understanding of the context received weak responses. Moreover, there were almost no responses on weekends. The research highlights that greater investment by platforms is essential, and this must be demanded by the government.
  10. Disinformation Threatens Democracy
  11. The past year has proven that, in Israel as in the rest of the world, the spread of disinformation is a real danger to our society and democracy. Disinformation and digital threats are not abstract—they harm society, deepen polarization, and fuel conflict. Israel has much to learn from the EU’s experience over the last decade and must foster collaboration between media, platforms, government, education, and civil society to cope with these important challenges.

 

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